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Abstract: State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are pervasive worldwide nowadays,
particularly in the emerging countries. SOEs are currently more active in global
markets than decades ago, engaging in cross-border trade and investment.
Concerns, hence, have arisen, that there are negative effects on global markets
associated with SOEs usually receiving various advantages, particularly, such
as financial advantages. Meanwhile, SOEs often act as the givers of financial
advantages. Current WTO rules are not sufficient to address the problem of
SOEs as givers of financial advantages, and the problem of SOEs as recipients
of financial advantages. This article tries to push the current WTO rules to their
limits, and to find potential approaches to address those problems. The efforts,
however, failed to some degree.
Hence, the article makes recommendations to improve them by three types of
proposals, i.e., trade remedies proposals, trade rules proposals, and a
competition rules proposal within the framework of the WTO. In the end, the
author also engages with other academic articles on SOEs, and where they
support the author’s position or differ from it. Explanations are also given on
how proposals made by the author are similar to or differ from what was
proposed in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and why the author’s
approach is better.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
State capitalism1 is omnipresent in the global economy.2 There are
various forms of state capitalism, including state-owned enterprises,
sovereign wealth funds and so on. This article’s focus, however, is mainly
government-controlled commercial enterprises (SOEs) that produce goods
or services.3 Looking at the data and information about SOEs’ number, size,
value, sector distribution and country distribution, it can be inferred that
SOEs are pervasive globally, particularly in emerging countries.4
Nowadays, the model of state capitalism has been embraced by many
countries, such as China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.5 SOEs usually
receive various advantages, which can be categorized into three types, i.e.,
financial advantages; monopolies and exclusive rights, such as production
permits and quotas; and regulatory and other advantages, such as
deregulation of SOEs in the fields of environment laws, domestic anti-trust
laws, bankruptcy laws, etc. SOEs are expanding into global markets
nowadays by trade and investment.6 SOEs in emerging countries are more
likely to engage in international trade than SOEs in countries that are
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) .7
Hence, political concerns in relation to SOEs arise frequently.8
Nevertheless, the economic concerns relating to SOEs merit more attention,
which is the focus of this article.9 One type of economic concern is that
giving advantages per se constitutes a concern, and the other is that the
1
See Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 3, 40 (2009) (There is an extensive literature that analyses state capitalism).
2
Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy
Implications, 9 (OECD Trade Policy Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 147, 2013).
3
See WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHI 26 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995) (There might be some
deviations across different definitions of SOEs).
4
See Grzegorz Kwiatkowski & Pawel Augustynowicz, State-owned Enterprises in the
Global Economy-Analysis Based on Fortune Global 500 List, in MANAGING INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL AND INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETY, 27- 29 (2015).
5
Carsten Sprenger, The Role of State Owned Enterprises in the Russian Economy,
(OECD Roundtable on Corporate Governance of SOEs. 2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/
corporategovernanceprinciples/42576825.pdf.
6
Max Büge et al., State-owned Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reason for
Concern?, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL, (May 2, 2013), https://voxeu.org/article/stateowned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern.
7
Hejing Chen & John Whalley, The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s
Prospective Trade Negotiations, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI
PAPERS NO. 48, 12 (Oct. 2014).
8
See Robert Loring Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 L. AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 256, 259 (1959).
9
Id. at 261. For information about impacts of SOEs in trade, see Madanmohan Ghosh
& John Whalley, State-owned Enterprises, Shirking and Trade Liberalization (NBER
Working Paper Series, No. 7696. May 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7696.
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behavior of SOEs to the extent that they receive advantages constitutes a
concern.10 The first kind of economic concern relates to distortion of global
markets, contamination of a level playing field and so on. The second
economic concern relates to the SOEs’ anti-competitive activities like
avoiding restrictions on below-cost pricing, cross-subsidization, etc.11 SOEs
are more likely to engage in such anti-competitive behavior after they
receive advantages.12 The above concerns make sense due to basic
differences between SOEs and private owned or controlled enterprises
(POEs). In light of the relationship between SOEs and governments: i)
SOEs can act as givers of advantages; ii) SOEs receive more advantages on
more favored terms; iv) the behavior of SOEs after they receive advantages
is different as opposed to POEs in that SOEs are more likely to pursue
revenues, rather than profits, and have public objectives in addition to
commercial objectives, while POEs are more likely to respond to market
signals. As a consequence, SOEs pose challenges to current WTO rules
with respect to financial advantages.
II. WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT WTO RULES ADDRESSING THE
PROBLEM OF SOES RECEIVING FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES
Many financial advantages given to SOEs can be regulated by WTO
rules, such as the Agreement on the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(hereinafter as SCM Agreement). However, there are some specific issues
concerning advantages given to SOEs that are not effectively covered by
current WTO rules when they are applied in the context of SOEs. This is
particularly true in the way in which the SCM Agreement defines certain
terms relevant to determining the existence of a subsidy. These terms
include the definitions of “a government or public body” “benefit” and
“specific”. The article will analyze the following issues, i.e., the problem of
SOEs giving advantages to others (include both SOEs and POEs)13; the
problem of SOEs in a downstream industry benefiting from SOEs in the
upstream industry that receive advantages; and certain problems of SOEs as
10

Sara Sultan Balbuena, Concerns Related to the Internationalisation of State-Owned
Enterprises: Perspective from Regulators, Government Owners and the Broader Business
Community 23-28, (OECD Corporate Governance Working Paper No.19, 2016).
11 See Kenneth C. Baseman, Open Entry Costs and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated
Markets, in GARY FROMM EDS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 329-70 (Cambridge MA:
MIT Press, 1981); Timothy J. Brennan, Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by
Regulated Monopolies, J. OF REG. ECON., 37 (March 1990).
12 David E. M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Anticompetitive Behavior by StateOwned Enterprises: Incentives and Capabilities, in COMPETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT,
ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, EDS., RICHARD R. GEDDES 7-14
(Hoover Institution Press, 2004).
13 In fact, SOEs give more advantages to other SOEs than to POEs; nevertheless, the
legal analysis is largely the same under the broader problem of SOEs as givers, in spite of
some variations such as the “one entity approach (recipient approach)” as illustrated in the
Section B.2 below.
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receivers of financial advantages.
A. The Problem of SOEs Giving Advantages to Others
SOEs give financial advantages to others in terms of capital and
inputs, such as raw materials, oil, gas, metals, minerals, electricity, water,
better access to railways, etc. For a subsidy to exist for purposes of the
SCM Agreement, there must be a financial contribution by a government or
public body. However, there is no clear answer to the question of whether
SOEs can be considered to be public bodies and therefore givers of
subsidies by looking at legal texts of the SCM Agreement. Three
interpretative approaches may be utilized to address the problem within
current WTO rules. However, all encounter difficulties.
1. The “Private Body” (entrust/direct) Approach within the SCM
Agreement
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement provides that “a subsidy
shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a
government or any public body… i.e. where:…(iv) a government makes
payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to
carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii)
above”. The “private body” approach within the SCM Agreement treats an
SOE as a private body “entrusted or directed by a government” to provide a
financial contribution. Hence, benefits given by SOEs to another entity can
be challenged as subsidies under the SCM Agreement as long as two
conditions are met, i) a link of “entrustment or direction” between the
government and the SOE in question;14 and ii) the SOE is deemed to be a
private body.
The First Condition
The “private body” approach encounters difficulties in satisfying the
first condition in three senses. First, in WTO jurisprudence, it is
complicated to prove an “entrustment or direction” link between a
government and an SOE.15 The Panel in Korea–Commercial Vessels
rejected the argument that “some degree of government ownership, by
itself, constitutes proof of government entrustment or direction.”16 In
essence, a certain degree of compulsion is needed. The mere facts that the
government is the controller of an entity cannot automatically imply that “a
14 Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 (1) J. OF WORLD
TRADE 167, 169 (2014).
15 WTO Panel Report, United States-Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies
(US-Export Restraints), WT/DS194/R, ¶¶ 8.29-8.31 (Jun. 29, 2001).
16 WTO Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels (KoreaCommercial Vessels), WT/DS273/R, ¶ 7.406 (Mar.7, 2005) [hereinafter Korea Commercial
Vessels Panel].
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government gives responsibility to,” “a government exercises its authority
over” or “threat or inducement.” Consequently, neither do those facts imply
the existence of the link of “entrustment or direction by a government.”
Second, although the link of “entrustment or direction by a government”, to
some degree, has been relaxed in US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on
DRAMs, the typical non-transparent relationship between the government
and SOEs makes it hard to get evidence of a specific “entrustment and
direction” in a particular case.
Third, even if the use of circumstantial evidence is permitted, the
conclusion is uncertain. On one extreme, there is exclusively private
conduct, and on the other extreme, there is exclusively governmental
conduct.17 Somewhere in the middle, there is a mixture such as a situation
might be found where an SOE engages in behavior deviating from that of
ordinary market players, such as providing goods or services at lower than
market prices or on terms unfavorable to itself. It is hard to categorize the
above situation as exclusively private conduct. One approach adopted by
the Japanese investigating authority (JIA) in Japan–DRAM (Korea) may
shed light on the situation. In that case, the factors of “non-commercial
reasonableness” and “the government’s capacity to influence” are regarded
as relevant circumstantial evidence to establish government intervention by
the investigating authority, and the Panel and Appellate Body (AB) didn’t
reject it.18 The Appellate Body agreed that, at least in principle, government
pressure on private creditors to restructure their obligations could amount
to “directing” a private body to engage in a “direct transfer of funds” and
thus amount to a subsidy.19 In cases of SOEs giving advantages, the factor
of “non-commercial reasonableness” and pressure from the government
may be found, as well as other circumstantial evidence as opposed to a case
involving POEs. For example, state ownership and the dynamics among the
government, the ruling Party and SOEs, are all relevant circumstantial
evidence. However, some of these relevant factors have been recognized by
WTO cases while others have not and the significance of each factor is not
clear.
The Second Condition
Moreover, the phrase “entrusts or directs a private body to carry out”
in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), clearly requires that the entity that is directed or
entrusted by a government is a private body. However, it can be disputed
whether an SOE is “a private body” in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv).20
17
See AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB,
¶ 107 (2005(.
18 AB Report, Japan-DRAMs (Korea), WT/DS336/AB/R, ¶¶ 117, 119 and 138 (2007).
19 Id. ¶ 123.
20 Julien Chaisse & Tsai-yu Lin (eds.), International Economic Law and Governance:
Essay in HONOUR OF MITSUO MATSUSHITA 243 (2016).
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From a standpoint of pure logic, a spectrum can be observed from on the
one extreme, a private body without any state-owned shares, and on the
other extreme, a government. This spectrum is based on the statement by
the AB in US–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) that “the
term ‘private body’ describes something that is not ‘a government or any
public body.’”21 The definition of the word “private” includes “of a
service, business, etc., provided or owned by an individual rather than the
state or a public body.”22 An inference can be made logically that SOEs are
somewhere in the middle between the two extremes, or at least SOEs are
not private bodies.
In summary, the “private body” approach is not sufficient to address
the problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, given that the standard
for satisfying the “entrust/direct” requirement is strict, and state ownership
or state control of an entity cannot automatically imply the existence of
“entrustment/direction”, even if relevant circumstantial evidence is taken
into consideration. In addition, it is hard to argue that SOEs are private
bodies.
2. The “Public Body” Approach within the SCM Agreement
Subsidies granted by SOEs may be subject to the SCM Agreement if it
can be demonstrated that the SOE at issue is a “public body”, and thereby
subject to the same rules that restrain a government from granting subsidies.
The WTO legal texts don’t mention explicitly that SOEs giving advantages
to others can be covered by the SCM Agreement, and neither do they
mention whether SOEs can be the givers of subsidies, nor do they give a
definition of the phrase “a public body”.23 Some authors have examined the
meaning of the term “public body” from the perspectives of the texts, the
context and the purpose and the negotiating history of the SCM Agreement,
and found that object and purpose of the SCM Agreement do not help a lot
in interpreting the term “public body”, and the negotiating history is too
ambiguous to rely upon.24 Four legal standards have been presented or
debated so far in WTO jurisprudence in the determination of what
constitutes a public body.25
21 AB Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),
WT/DS379/AB/R, ¶ 291 (2011). [hereinafter Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
Appellate Body Report].
22 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/
R, ¶¶ 291-92 (2011).
23
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
24 Id.
25 These four standards have been discussed in the following cases: Korea Commercial
Vessels Panel Report, supra note 16; Panel Report, US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties (China), WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report]; Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
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First, the “government organ/agency” standard, which views a public
body as functionally equivalent to a government organ or agency, which
would mean that SOEs are not public bodies, was rejected by panels and the
AB.26 Second, the “majority ownership” standard, which views a public
body as an entity that is majority government owned, and hence SOEs are
public bodies, was rejected by the AB.27 Third, the “government control”
standard, adopted by two panels, which views SOEs as public bodies since
they are controlled by the government, was rejected by the AB.28 Finally,
the “vested governmental authority” standard, which was adopted by the
AB, views a public body as an entity that possesses, exercises, or is vested
with governmental authority. The last two standards of “government
control” and “vested governmental authority” generated much heated
debate and controversy. However, both standards are limited in their ability
to address the problem of SOEs giving subsidies to others SOEs as
analyzed below.
The “Government Control” Standard
Although this standard was rejected by the AB, many commentaries
and people support this standard. Hence, it is worth being discussed here. It
can be summarized that under the “government control” standard, evidence
of “majority government ownership” alone is sufficient to satisfy the
“government control” standard, and hence, to establish the entity in
question is a public body, unless it can be proved otherwise by the entity
and the government concerned that the control is absent.29 Nevertheless, the
Panel that adopted the “government control” standard also considered other
factors, such as the existence of meaningful control and the nature of the
entity. In Korea Commercial Vessels, the Panel found that the entity in
question was a public body primarily based on the evidence that it was 100
Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21. Recently cases reaffirm: Panel Report, United
States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS437/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter US—Countervailing Measures (China)
Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter US—Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report]; Panel Report, United States
— Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India,
WTO Doc. WT/DS436/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter US—Carbon Steel (India)
Panel Report]; AB Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB (adopted Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter
US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report].
26 See Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21,
¶ 321; Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 8.55, 8.59.
27 See Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21,
¶ 277.
28 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.50; Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 8.73.
29 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 8.134-136.
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percent owned by the government or other public bodies.30 Nevertheless,
the Panel also stated that the operations of the entity were conducted by
presidents who were appointed and dismissed by the government, and
mentioned that the government enjoyed extensive control over the
parameters within which the entity in question (KEXIM) must operate. The
Panel found that KEXIM would follow whatever the government directed
or asked it to do.31 Also, the Panel considered that the “public” nature of
KEXIM is further confirmed by KEXIM’s own perception of itself.32
Therefore, the author views that the Panel in this case also considered
the factor of “meaningful control.” However, the factor of meaningful
control was regarded as unnecessary, and the factor of “formal (i.e.,
majority voting) control” alone is decisive and sufficient to find the
existence of a public body.33 In addition, the panel took the view that
whether “an entity [was] operating on a commercial basis” was not relevant
for deciding whether the entity was a public body. Rather, whether it
“operated on a commercial basis” was relevant for the “benefit” analysis in
the subsidization analysis of the SCM Agreement.34 It also considered the
“pursuance of public policy objectives” as an unnecessary factor in finding
a public body.35
The “Vested Governmental Authority” Standard
The “vested governmental authority” standard takes the view that the
relevant factors to establish vested governmental authority include
ownership, control, meaningful control, appointments of managers in high
positions, and policy mandates, all of which need to be examined.36 One
factor is not sufficient and determinative.37 In U.S.–China AC/CVD, the AB
viewed the factor of “meaningful control” as relevant evidence for
exercising governmental functions, by stating that “where the evidence
shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there
30

Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.172;
Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.50-56.
32 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.50.
33 As to the distinction between “formal control” and “meaningful control,” the former
can be evidenced by majority ownership or majority voting, while the latter means that the
daily operation of the entity and decision-making of the entity is not independent. For
instance, under “formal control,” the managers of the entity enjoy large discretion in terms
of making decisions regarding daily operation of the entity, without much interference from
the majority owner. The managers or CEO are more likely to be independent and behave like
professional managers, although their appointments are largely influenced by the majority
owner. Under “meaningful control,” the shareholders (majority owners) have extensive
control over the mangers’ decision making in daily operation of the entity.
34 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.45-7.50.
35 Id. ¶7.50.
36 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, ¶¶
349-350, 355.
37 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 4.20, 5.37.
31
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is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way,
then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is
exercising governmental authority.”38 It might be inferred from this AB’s
statement that evidence of formal control plus meaningful control may
satisfy the standard of vested authority. However, the case of US–Carbon
Steel (India) clarifies “meaningful control” and its relative weight. It held
that “meaningful control” is relevant, but not decisive or exclusive. The
substantive standard should be distinct from the evidentiary standard.39 The
AB thinks it is wrong to construe the term “public body” to mean any entity
that is “meaningfully controlled” by a government.40 In other words, the
factor of “meaningful control” only has evidential weight, rather than the
weight of serving as the substantive standard.
Limitations in the Context of Chinese SOEs
There are limitations in using these two standards to address the
problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to others. First, the
consequences of the “government control” standard may give rise to the
concern of legal fragmentation at the international level if SOEs are deemed
to be public bodies under WTO rules while in the international business
community, it is widely accepted that the behaviors of SOEs, who are doing
merely commercial activities, or who are merely commercial entities,
cannot be attributed to the state. In the international investment area, private
entities can bring investment claims against the host state under bilateral
investment treaties or free trade agreements, while the state is not allowed
to bring such claims. In practice, SOEs usually have the standing to bring
such investment claims. To that end, SOEs are not deemed to be
governments, and the behavior of SOEs---bringing an investment claim---is
not attributed to their government. Second, the consequences of the
“government control” standard may give rise to the concern of legal
fragmentation at the WTO level. It creates different treatments of SOEs
within the WTO, i.e., treating SOEs as public bodies in the context of
subsidies while treating SOEs as non-public bodies in the context of nonsubsidies.
In contrast, the “vested governmental authority” standard creates
uncertainty. The answer remains unclear as to the question of whether
SOEs can be deemed to be public bodies, in that the answer is dependent on
the evidence found in every case. Only in one case has the AB held that
state-owned banks (SOBs) are deemed to be public bodies, while the AB in
the same case decided that other SOEs are not public bodies within the

38

Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, ¶

318.
39
40
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SCM Agreement.41 The AB in US–Carbon Steel (India) held that the
National Mineral Development Corporation is not a public body within the
SCM Agreement.42 Furthermore, it seems that the AB doesn’t attach
different weights to different factors, except for stating that all relevant
factors shall be examined conjunctively. It provides little guidance for
practice. For instance, the AB in US–China AD/CVD relied heavily on the
“meaningful control” factor in finding SOBs as public bodies within the
SCM Agreement,43 while the AB in US–Carbon Steel (India) clarified that
the “meaningful control” factor, which is similar to other relevant factors,
shall not be assigned a decisive weight.44 However, in the latest case of USCountervailing Measures (China), the Panel seemed to follow the earlier
case, noting that the “meaningful control” factor was weighted significantly
by the AB in US–China AD/CVD.45 It might be better to clarify, at least, the
weight assigned to each factor.
Moreover, the AB explained that among other relevant factors to be
considered are the legal order,46 “. . . economic environment prevailing in
the country, the scope and content of government policies relating to the
sector in question, etc.”47 However, the literature and WTO jurisprudence to
date have not analyzed in detail the specific factors considered by each
standard, or the extent to which they overlap with one another.48 The
elements mentioned above are not assigned significant weights except for
“relevance.” Most cases are brought by a WTO member complaining about
the countervailing measures imposed on products exported by their SOEs to
an importing country. Hence, panels evaluate whether the investigating
authority in the importing country has conducted a thorough examination
through all relevant factors in determination of whether the SOE in question
constitutes a public body. In that sense, it remains to be seen whether panels
in future cases will state that factors like economic environment prevailing
41 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶¶ 347, 356, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted
Mar. 11, 2011).
42 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 4.1-4.55.
43 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, supra note 37, ¶ 318.
44 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.37.
45 US Countervailing Measures (China) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.74.
46 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.54; US—Carbon Steel
(India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.66, in which the public body issue was not appealed
since the panel applied the “vested governmental authority” standard.
47 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.29.
48 For more debate about whether SOEs are “public bodies” within the SCM
Agreement, see Ding, supra note 14; Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global
Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261 (2016). For critics of AB’s standard from the
perspectives of interpretative method and legal implications, see Michel Cartland, Gerard
Depayre & Jan Woznowski, Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement? 46
J. WORLD TRADE 979 (2012).
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in the country, the scope and content of government policies relating to the
sector in question, should be examined, or whether panels will further give
different weights respectively to each factor.
In the context of Chinese SOEs, many factors seem to be relevant: the
factor of which industry the SOE is in; the factor of whether there are
related governmental policies to encourage and support the industry
concerned; the factor of market structure of the industry and the market
power enjoyed by the SOE, particularly whether the SOEs benefit from
monopoly and exclusive rights; the factor of the extent to which various
advantages are granted to the industry, etc. These factors should play
significant roles in the determination of whether a Chinese SOE is a public
body or not, since these factors are typical in the context of Chinese SOEs.
Taking the factors of the industry an SOE is in and whether the SOE
has been granted monopolies as an example, except for SOBs which have
already been found to be public bodies, SOEs in strategic industries, such as
coal, airline and aviation, telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical,
shipping and manufacturing of ships, and electricity, are more likely to
satisfy both the “government control” standard and “vested governmental
authority” standard. In contrast, SOEs in pillar industries such as steel, nonferrous metal, automotive and auto parts, machinery and equipment,
information technology, are less likely to satisfy the “vested governmental
authority” standard, although the “vested governmental authority” standard
may be satisfied in industries with SOE blocs, such as in the steel, nonferrous metals, and automotive industries. One major difference in the
above two sets of industries lies in the fact whether SOEs have monopolies
or exclusive rights in the industry they are in respectively, and whether the
competition is limited in favor of SOEs to the detriment of POEs in terms
of entry, importation, exportation, distribution, and so on. For instance, in
cases of China–US AD/CVD and China–US AD,49 the products under
investigation were petrochemicals, rubber, steel, tires, pipe and tube, woven
sacks, thermal paper, kitchen appliance, lawn groomers, print graphics, etc.,
produced by SOEs who are in different industries, with different market
power and different degrees of government support.50 These factors should
warrant significant considerations and different treatment as to the question
whether the SOE in question constitutes a public body, but current WTO
case law does not distinguish them.

Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010); US
Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report, supra note 25.
50 See Yu Xiangming (于祥明), Yige Hafo Anli De Zaisikao: Zhongguo Shuini Chanye
Fazhan (一个哈佛案例的再思考：中国水泥产业发展), SHANGHAI SEC. NEWSPAPER, Nov.
7, 2012, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hyyj/20121107/025313597055.shtml.
49

286

Reforming WTO Rules on State-Owned Enterprises
39:275 (2019)

3. The Approach of Regulating the Behavior of SOEs
The above two approaches of “private body” and “public body” are in
the context of subsidies within the SCM Agreement. This section discusses
the approach of regulating the behaviors of SOEs in the context of WTO
rules generally, and protocols made by Members in particular. Giving
advantages to others by SOEs can be categorized as one behavior the SOEs
conduct. Such conduct may give rise to the level of discriminatory behavior
or decision-making by the SOEs based on non-commercial considerations.
Hence, the approach of regulating the behaviors of SOEs can address the
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, particularly providing goods
or services at lower prices or on favorable terms. Paragraph b of Article 3
of China’s Accession Protocol can be resorted to since it provides that the
prices and availability of goods and services provided by public or state
enterprises, in areas including transportation, energy, basic
telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production, should be in
conformance with the non-discrimination principle.51 A claim under this
provision needs to be based on differentiated pricing practices.
However, the specific commitment is only applicable to China.
Besides, the non-discriminatory obligation only works in domestic markets.
Moreover, this particular rule only works in one segment of the domestic
market where FOEs are present. In other words, it only works in a situation
where SOEs give advantages to others who are in competition with FOEs
(foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises) that
produce goods or services in China. In practice, there are few FOEs in the
Chinese domestic market in the abovementioned segments. It doesn’t work
in situations where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs who are in
competition with imported goods, or where SOEs give advantages to other
SOEs who export goods or services to importing markets. What’s worse,
WTO rules currently do not regulate the behavior of SOEs in general, let
alone the obligation of commercial considerations for SOEs, except for
those SOEs with exclusive trading rights.
4. Conclusion of Section A
In summary, the problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs is
not sufficiently addressed by the current WTO rules in that the “private
body” approach within the SCM Agreement faces difficulty in proving the
link of entrustment or direction between the government and the SOE in a
particular case, and in proving that SOEs are private bodies. The “public
body” approach also fails in that the legal standards and evidential factors
for the question of what constitutes a public body have limitations in WTO
jurisprudence. Particularly in the context of Chinese SOEs, insufficient
attention is given to the factors of which industry the SOE is in and of
51 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23
Nov. 2001, art. 3.
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whether the SOE has been granted monopolies or exclusive rights, and
other factors that are typical in the context of Chinese SOEs. The behavior
approach also failed in the sense that the specific commitment made by
China only applies partially to the situation where SOEs give advantages to
other SOEs. The WTO rules, in general, do not regulate the behavior of
SOEs directly.
B. The Problem of Upstream Subsidies in the Context of Chinese SOEs
Input subsidies and upstream subsidies refer to subsidies granted to an
input purchased by the downstream industry, which is in competition with
imports or which exports to foreign markets.52 There are four situations of
concern to my analysis, i.e., situation 1 is where SOEs dominate both the
upstream and the downstream industries; situation 2 where POEs dominate
the upstream industry and SOEs dominate the downstream industry;
situation 3 where SOEs dominate the upstream industry and POEs dominate
the downstream industry; and situation 4 where POEs dominate both the
upstream and the downstream industries. Typically, when most literature
discusses whether upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the
downstream industry and analyzes the difficulties encountered under the
SCM Agreement, it is done in the context of situation 4.
Situations 1, 2, and 3 are worthy of attention. They arise when SOEs
are either the major player in the upstream industry or the downstream
industry or both. Particularly in situation 1, for instance, in the context of
Chinese SOEs, the coal industry is the upstream industry in relation to the
steel industry, in which SOEs are the major players in China.53 Actually, the
steel industry receives advantages of three types: i) SOEs in the coal
industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for
transporting coal used for generating electricity, and the steel industry gets
better deals from the electricity companies for purchasing electricity in
large quantities directly rather than purchasing on-grid electricity; ii) SOEs
in the coal industry receive advantages from having better access to
railways for transporting coal used for producing steel; and iii) the coal
industry also gets compensation specifically for supporting the steel
industry by providing coal at lower prices. Examples can be found in
Pinding Shan Tian AN Coal Ltd. (an SOE).54 This situation is also typical
52 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (The MIT Press, 1984).
53 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, State Enterprises in the
Steel Sector, Directorate For Science, Technology and Innovation Steel Committee,
DSTI/SC(2017)10/FINAL, Dec. 20, 2018, ¶¶ 14-9. http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/SC(2017)10/FINAL&docLanguage=En
54 The example of Pingding Shang Tian An Coal Ltd receiving compensation for
providing lower prices of coal can be found in its annual financial reports (Shanghai Stock
Exchange) from 2008-2014, which can be found at http://english.sse.com.cn/listed/
company/cannouncements/index.shtml?COMPANY_CODE=601666
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in industries of chemicals, petrochemicals, and aluminum. Four approaches
may be put forward to address this situation through current rules.
Nonetheless, all of them encounter difficulties in the context of Chinese
SOEs.
1. The Subject Approach
The subject approach treats the upstream SOEs as public bodies, who
are givers of subsidies through the provision of goods or services. This
approach can apply to situation 1 and 3. However, the difficulty of the
approach has been discussed in the section above.
2. The Recipient Approach
The recipient approach is to treat the upstream SOEs and downstream
SOEs as related entities as if they were part of one group of related
companies. In such a case, both the upstream and downstream SOEs are
viewed as direct recipients of the subsidies. The Panel in US-Softwood
Lumber III concluded that where there is “complete identity between the
tenure holder/logger and the lumber producer, no pass-through analysis is
required.”55 In United States–Softwood Lumber IV, it was held that if two
industries operate at arm’s length, a “benefit pass-through” analysis is
needed.56 It can be inferred that if the two producers do not operate at arm’s
length or if there is complete identity between the two producers, a “benefit
pass-through” analysis is not necessary since these two producers can be
deemed to be one. In that sense, the producers of the processed products are
also direct recipients of subsidies.
The same logic can be applied to the case of SOEs to examine whether
SOEs in the upstream industry and downstream industry are related or not.
It can be argued that the state is the major shareholder or controller of the
two SOEs, and hence, SOEs in the upstream industry and downstream
industry can be treated as related entities or their transactions can be viewed
as not at arm’s length in this regard. Furthermore, from the perspective of
accountancy, there might be one financial report for the whole corporate
group. This argument works well especially in a situation where the parent
SOE is subsidized for its products, which are inputs for subsidiary SOEs,
who produce the processed products. For instance, in natural resources
industries, vertical integration is common in China. The SOE in the
exploration sector is usually a sibling of an SOE in the processing sector.
To that end, the upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the
downstream industry. Subsidization of inputs, produced by the upstream
SOEs, can be deemed to be subsidization of the final product, produced by
Panel Report, United States — Sections 7.72, 7.74 of the Softwood Lumber III, WTC
Doc. WT/DS236/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2002).
56 Appellate Body Report, United States –Softwood Lumber IV, ¶¶ 152-66, WTC Doc.
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004).
55
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the downstream SOEs.
However, opposing arguments exist that the key test for whether two
entities are related or not lies in whether the transaction in question is
conducted at arm’s length. It is not reasonable to treat all sibling SOEs as
one entity ignoring the nature of transactions in practice. In addition, from a
business viewpoint, it may be difficult to demonstrate that SOEs in the
upstream industry and SOEs in the downstream industry are in one group,
particularly if they operate in different industries, produce different
products, keep separate accounts and so on.
3. The Approach of “Benefits Pass-Through”
The analysis of “benefits pass-through” examines “whether
subsidization of the upstream industry results in the provision of inputs by
the upstream industry at a cheaper price than the price prevailing on world
markets.”57 In the context of SOEs in the similar situation of subsidized
inputs, the “benefits pass-through” analysis is needed to prove that there are
benefits flowing from the upstream industry to the downstream industry,
evidenced by, for instance, low pricing of goods or services provided by the
upstream SOEs to the downstream SOEs. If the upstream subsidies
(provided to coal industry) led to prices of coal lower than the normal
market prices in China than world prices, a potential subsidy might exist
with respect to the downstream industry such as the steel industry.
Taking the steel industry as an example, first, SOEs in the coal
industry receive advantages from railways (all are SOEs) in having better
access to railways for transporting their coal designated for generating
electricity, and prices of coal sold to electricity companies (almost all are
SOEs) are lower than the prices when coal is sold to other sectors. The steel
companies usually approach electricity companies for lower priced
electricity. Second, SOEs in the coal industry also receive advantages from
railways (SOEs) in having better access to railways for transporting their
coal designated for producing steel. Third, in some cases, the coal industry
receives subsidies specifying that it is compensation for providing coal at
lower prices to the steel industry.58 Hence, the government imposes
conditions on the subsidized industry (the majority of which are SOEs) and
requires them to sell at lower prices to the downstream industry (the
majority of which are SOEs). The consequence is that the steel industry
benefits from lower cost coal, electricity and transportation.
As a practical matter, it be may difficult to show that benefits flow
Panel Report, United States — Section 7.71 of the Softwood Lumber III, WTC Doc.
WT/DS236/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2002); WILLIAM R. CLINE (ED.), TRADE POLICY IN THE
1980S 352-3 (MIT Press, 1st ed. 1983).
58 Usually the title of subsidies granted in this regard specifically state that the subsidies
are for compensating the coal industry for their encouraging and supporting the steel
industry.
57
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from the upstream sector to the downstream sector through lower pricing.
Due to the transparency problem, it is hard to find whether there are explicit
governmental policies by different levels of authorities. In addition, it is
difficult to prove that inputs are provided at cheaper prices than the prices
prevailing on world markets or prices under market conditions.
4. The Approach of Channeling Through “Income or Price Support”
The last approach is related to a specific situation where subsidies are
granted to the upstream SOEs for the purpose of maintaining prices in the
domestic market. This situation may involve “income or price support”
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement, which
provides that “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there is any form of
income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 1994”.
Subsidies to the upstream SOEs can be viewed in totality as a scheme of
income support, for instance, which leads to lower prices of coal/energy for
the steel industry. However, while this GATT provision was incorporated
into the SCM Agreement, it is mainly of historical interest, cases today are
normally brought under the more detailed provisions of the SCM
Agreement.59
5. Conclusion of Section B
As for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit
from transactions with subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, the
various approaches that are available within the current WTO rules are all
inadequate. In respect of the subject approach, it may be easy to find some
SOEs are public bodies while it is hard to conclude the same for other SOEs
depending on the industry/sector they are in and the nature of the SOE. In
respect of the recipient approach, it is hard to treat two separate SOEs in the
upstream and downstream sectors as one group of related companies
although some arguments can be made. In respect of the “benefits passthrough” approach, it is difficult to find evidence of lowering prices. The
approach of “price or income support” is mainly of historical interest.
C. The Problem of Chinese SOEs as Receivers of Financial Advantages
1. SOEs Receive Financial Advantages Prior to Their Privatization
In a situation where a POE receive financial advantages and
shareholders of the POE changed afterward, no controversy would arise
whether financial advantages received previously would be affected by the
change of shareholders. However, the analysis may be different if the
change of shareholders is privatization. For instance, Chinese SOEs receive
59 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XVI, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
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financial advantages prior to privatizations. After privatization, some of
these entities continue to engage in international markets. Problems arise if
benefits from subsidies granted to SOEs prior to privatization continue to
exist, and hence, the entity after privatization will have comparative
advantages over its competitors.
The WTO rules in this regard are confusing. In the early cases of US–
Lead and Bismuth II 60 and US–Countervailing Measures on Certain EC
Products, it was held that a full privatization at arm’s length and for fair
market value of an SOE that received prior subsidies can give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the benefit conferred by prior subsidies is
extinguished.61 However, in EC–Civil Aircraft, which concerns partial
privatization, the AB divided in three ways. i) One position is that the
presumption of extinction only applies to full privatization, rather than
partial privatizations or private-to-private sales; ii) The second position
views that the presumption rule also applies to partial privatization and
private-to-private sales. Nevertheless, this position noted the issue of a
transfer of control to the new owners; iii) The third position is that in a sale
of shares, regardless whether there is a transfer of control or not, the value
of assets of the company, to which the shares attach, does not change at all,
including the benefit of any subsidy granted, which continues to benefit the
recipient.62
Hence, as for the privatizations with a transfer of control, the
uncertainty continues in respect of whether benefits of the subsidies would
be extinguished under the three positions. To that end, the legal problem
remains that in cases of partial privatization of Chinese SOEs when there is
a transfer of control, it is not clear whether subsidies received prior to
privatization can still be subject to the SCM Agreement given that it is not
clear based on current jurisprudence whether the legal element of “benefit”
as required under the SCM Agreement can be established or not.
2. The Element of “Benchmark Prices”
In order to find whether there is a subsidy, a benchmark is needed to
examine whether benefits are given to recipients that are otherwise not

60 Appellate Body Report, United States —of the Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom (US – Lead and Bismuth II), WTC Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted May 10,
2000), ¶ 68.
61 Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning
Certain Products from the European Communities (US – Countervailing Measures on
Certain EC Products), ¶117, WTC Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (adopted Dec. 9, 2002); Panel
Report, European Communities — Section 7.248 of the Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft), WTC Doc.
WT/DS316/R (adopted June 30, 2010).
62 US-Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, supra note 61, ¶¶ 730-2.
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available under market conditions.63 In cases of SOEs receiving advantages,
the market in which SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where
SOEs are monopolists or dominate the market. How is the factor, for
instance, that the state dominates the sector through SOEs, relevant in
finding that Chinese prices, in general, do not “permit a proper
comparison”?64
The current standard for using an alternative benefit benchmark is
relatively strict. Article 15(b) of China’s Accession Protocol, which does
not have an expiration date, allows choosing a different benchmark if
market economy conditions are not prevailing or the possibility that
prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as
appropriate benchmarks.65 However, the burden of proof is on the
importing country to explain the choice of a different benchmark. First, the
standard focuses on the outcome, i.e., whether the proposed benchmark is
market-determined, rather than a function of the source of the price.66
Second, it was held in US Countervailing Measures (China) that there is no
per se rule that the fact the government is the predominant supplier proves
price distortion.67 “Evidence relating to government ownership of SOEs and
its respective market shares does not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
basis for concluding that in-country prices are distorted.”68 Finally, factors
relating to the structure of relevant market, whether the market is dominated
by the state, SOEs’ respective market shares, whether systematic subsidies
are associated with the market, etc., are only deemed to be relevant factors,
rather than decisive factors, in finding whether the government influences
the pricing conduct of SOEs.69
In sum, in cases of SOEs receiving advantages, although the market in
which SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are
monopolists or dominate the market, it is usually difficult to find the
existence of benefits, which is a legal element of establishing the existence
of subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement. Although current rules allow
choosing a different benchmark in identifying benefits subject to certain
conditions, the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one industry cannot
automatically imply the price distortion which warrants an alternative
benchmark.

63

Art. 1.1(b) and 14 of the SCM Agreement.
Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 261 (2016).
65 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23
Nov. 2001, art. 15 (b) and (d).
66 US—Carbon Steel (India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.154.
67 US Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.51.
68 Id. ¶ 4.62.
69 Id. ¶ 4.62.
64
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3. The Element of “Specificity”
The above problems primarily cast challenges to whether the measure
in question constitutes a subsidy. In addition, the SCM Agreement requires
that an actionable subsidy must be specific.70 In the context of China,
however, it is hard to prove “specificity” either as “industry specificity” or
“enterprise specificity.”
First, various SOEs that dominate in many industries receive financial
advantages. In practice, policies adopted by the Chinese government
usually identify strategic industries and pillar industries and provide
guidelines to favor these industries, in which SOEs dominate. However,
due to the non-transparency, details of how this favoritism is implemented
may be difficult to find, such as through granting specific financial
advantages. Thus, policies and guidelines that specify certain industries as
favored industries cannot be used per se to establish “industry specificity”
in making subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement. Second, the recipients
of advantages are largely SOEs even if the conditions for receiving
advantages are neutral in their face. China’s commitments in its accession
to the WTO include a special rule of specificity in relation to SOEs,71 i.e.,
subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as specific if SOEs are the
predominant recipients of such subsidies or if SOEs receive
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies. However, there have
been no WTO cases resorting to this special rule so far. The reason might
be evidentiary difficulties in finding information showing that SOEs are
predominant recipients of the subsidies at issue or that SOEs receive
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies. The “specificity” rule
focuses on the outcome of a subsidy, rather than the status of the recipients
in markets. Thus, it is hard to prove “enterprise specificity.”
In sum, it is difficult to satisfy the legal elements of “specificity” in
cases of Chinese SOEs receiving advantages, given that information in this
regard is scarce in terms of finding either “industry specific” or “enterprise
specific.”
D. Summary of Section II
In summary, this section examined the deficiencies of current WTO
rules in regulating financial advantages in the context of SOEs. First, the
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others is not sufficiently addressed
by the current WTO rules neither through the “private body” approach, the
“public body” approach, nor the behavior rules within the WTO. Second, as
for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit from
transactions with subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, various
approaches are all inadequate. Third, in respect of SOEs as recipients of
70

Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
WTO, Protocol on the Accession of People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov.
2001, para.10.2 of Part I.
71
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financial advantages, the privatizations of SOEs with a transfer of control
may raise uncertainty with respect to whether subsidies received prior to
privatization can still be subject to the SCM Agreement. Also, in cases of
SOEs receiving advantages, it is usually difficult to find the existence of
benefits, which is one legal element in establishing the existence of a
subsidy if the benchmark is the market where SOEs dominate, since current
WTO jurisdiction holds that the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one
industry or market cannot automatically imply price distortion which
warrants an alternative benchmark. Finally, it is difficult to satisfy the legal
element of “specificity” in cases of SOEs receiving advantages due to the
transparency issue.
III. PROPOSALS TO THE WTO RULES TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEMS
The author makes proposals to address the deficiencies in WTO rules
regarding SOEs giving financial advantages to others and SOEs receiving
advantages. The proposals are divided into three groups, (i) proposals
relating to improving WTO trade remedies; (ii) proposals relating to
improving WTO trade rules generally; and (iii) proposals for adding
competition rules to the WTO Agreement. A combination will be
introduced in order to solve all problems.
A. Trade Remedies Proposals
1. Proposals to Solve the Problem of SOEs as Givers
The trade remedies proposals are focused on changes to the SCM
Agreement in order to ensure that financial advantages received by or
granted to SOEs are adequately controlled. The author would not propose to
substantively change the definition of “entrust/direct” to mean that “state
control can automatically imply the existence of entrustment or direction”
since there may be situations of facial control where controllers do not
interfere with the daily operation of the entity. Instead, the author proposes
to change the interpretation of the SCM Agreement, referring to as “the
public body presumption proposal.” It proposes that entities under the
meaningful control of the government with monopolistic or dominant
market power can be presumptively deemed to be public bodies unless
evidence to the contrary is put forth by the responding party with regard to
the entity in question. The presumption of “public body” status of SOEs
based on control and market status, places the burden of proof on the
Member who has the SOE to demonstrate either that “meaningful control”
is not present in a sense that the government is not in actual control of daily
operations, and that the decision-making of the SOE is independent, or that
the SOE in question do not enjoy monopolistic or dominant market power
out of favor from governments. If these can be proved, the presumption is
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rebutted.
Possibility of Realizing the Proposal
The proposal has the potential to be realized in practice. First, the AB
states that its view on “public body” comes from the analysis of text,
context, object or purpose, and that its interpretation merely “coincides”
with “the essence of Article 5 of the ILCDAs,” which provides that “[t]he
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article
4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in
the particular instance.”72 It might be interpreted that SOEs that have been
granted monopolies or exclusive rights are entities empowered by the state
to exercise elements of the governmental authority given that most
monopolies or exclusive rights are granted out of public interest, or at least
governments so allege.
Second, the factor “meaningful control” does not go too far away from
the latest jurisprudence and would not raise too much controversy. The AB
in US-Carbon Steel (India) clarified that the “meaningful control” factor
shall not be assigned a decisive weight compared to other relevant factors.73
In the latest case of US-Countervailing Measures (China), the Panel
seemed to view that the “meaningful control” factor was weighted
significantly by the AB in US-China AD/CVD.74 The Panel did not question
the U.S.’ interpretation that “public body” can mean an entity that is
controlled by a government such that the government can use the resources
of that entity as its own, citing the concept of “meaningful control” relied
upon by the Appellate Body in US-China AC/CVD. The Panel in USCountervailing Measures (China) found that the U.S. investigative
authority did not apply their alleged “meaningful control” standard in the
investigated case at hand even assuming that the alleged standard is the
right interpretation of the term “public body.” To that end, it can be inferred
that the Panel did not follow the AB explicitly to denounce the
interpretation that “meaningful control” is a decisive factor in interpreting
the term “public body,” which the AB has clearly denounced in US-Carbon
Steel (India). The panel’s attitude towards the significance of the factor
“meaningful control” in the interpretation of the term “public body” seems
different from that of the AB. Although the AB’s view is more
authoritative, the contradiction between the AB and panels may open the
72
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (Jul. 26, 2001), art. 8;
Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznowskl, Is Something Going Wrong in the
WTO Dispute Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 996-1001 (2012), 997.
73 US—Carbon Steel (India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.37.
74 US Countervailing Measures (China) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.74.
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door for my proposal in the future.
Third, the factor relating to “market status” would not go much away
from the AB’s interpretation. The AB mentioned that relevant factors may
play different roles in different cases, such as the factor of market power
and the industry in which the entity is. The AB explained that “whether the
conduct of an entity is that of a public body must in each case be
determined on its own merits, with due regard to the core characteristics
and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with the government,
and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which
the investigated entity operates75 . . . Evidence regarding the scope and
content of government policies relating to the sector in which the
investigated entity operates may inform the question of whether the conduct
of an entity is that of a public body.”76 Hence, the factor of whether the
SOE enjoys monopolistic/dominant market positions out of receiving
various advantages from the government could be a relevant factor.
Problems Solved by this Proposal
The proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving financial
advantages to others, and the problem of upstream subsidies in the situation
of SOEs from a legal viewpoint. One major reason that these two problems
may escape the discipline of the SCM Agreement lies in that SOEs that are
givers of advantages cannot fit into the categories of “governments” or
“public body” captured by the SCM Agreement, and hence, it cannot be
established that there is a subsidy given by a government or public body.
By treating SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and
are given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions as public
bodies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, the proposal expands
the reach of SCM Agreement to many cases where SOEs give advantages
to others, and where SOEs receive upstream subsidies and give advantages
to downstream industries. The proposal makes it possible to establish there
is a subsidy in these two situations and makes them subject to the discipline
of SCM Agreement by focusing on the nature of SOEs as givers of
advantages as a subject matter.
The proposal can solve the two problems largely from a practical
viewpoint. First, the emphasis on the factor of whether the SOE enjoys
monopolistic or dominant market positions out of receiving various
advantages from governments has economic grounds. If SOEs are in
dominant positions in a specific industry or market, with no or little
competition from POEs, these SOEs could provide goods or services lower
than the world prices. If SOEs were not in dominant positions in a specific
industry, their provision of goods or service at prices lower than the world
prices would not affect the market too much since POEs can compete with
75
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them in the market. To that end, whether SOEs have monopolies or
exclusive rights in the industry can be the standard for the typology of
SOEs. For instance, SOEs in energy producing sectors may provide energy
at prices below market rates to SOEs in other sectors. This proposal directly
responds to the problem of productive inputs provided by SOEs to other
SOEs.
Second, the presumption of SOEs under meaningful control of the
government and with monopolistic or dominant market power as public
bodies, fits into the reality of China and can well handle the problems at
issue. For instance, Chinese SOEs in strategic industries, such as coal,
airline and aviation, telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical,
shipping and manufacturing of ships, and electricity, enjoy monopolies or
dominant market power due to statutory grants or governmental measures
limiting competition in the favor of these SOEs. The Chinese Government
usually maintains state ownership in absolute control of strategic industries
with the purpose of “protecting public interest, national interest, and
security interest”. It fits into the “public body” discussion insofar the stress
is all on the public interest. The proposal takes into consideration that it is
difficult to gather evidence regarding SOEs due to their non-transparency.
The proposal is more likely to motivate China to move toward a direction
that could produce evidence about Chinse SOEs not being meaningfully
controlled by the government or reducing the predominant status of SOEs
in strategic industries particularly. Hence, China may have the motive to
reduce or eliminate the actual control over daily operation and management
of SOEs, and the decision-making of SOEs may become independent and
be commercially based, on the one hand, and to increase competition in
strategic or pillar industries, on the other hand.
2. Proposals to Solve the Problem of SOEs as Receivers
Privatization
In cases of SOEs that had received financial advantages being partial
privatized afterwards with a transfer of control to private entities, it remains
unclear whether subsidies received prior to privatization can still be subject
to the SCM Agreement. It is due to the fact that current jurisprudence is not
clear whether the legal element of “benefit” as required under the SCM
Agreement would be extinguished or not. The author proposes to treat the
benefits obtained prior to privatization as not extinguished even if the
privatization is at arm’s length and for fair-market value, given that
competitive advantages still remain.
Benchmark
In cases of SOEs receiving advantages, although the market in which
SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are monopolists or
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dominate the market, it is usually difficult to find the existence of benefits,
which is a legal element of establishing the existence of subsidies subject to
the SCM Agreement. Although current rules allow choosing a different
benchmark, the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one industry cannot
automatically imply there is price distortion which warrants an alternative
benchmark.
The author proposes to have a presumptive rule regarding benchmarks,
which can be applied in cases of SOEs receiving advantages where the
SOEs are monopolists or dominant players.77 In other words, it is refutably
presumed that the fact that the government/SOEs is/are the predominant
supplier(s) establishes that there is price distortion. For instance, selecting a
different benchmark is allowed in the case of Chinese SOEs who are
dominant in the industry in question. Instead of focusing on the
consequences of SOEs receiving advantages, such as whether the price is
market-determined, the proposal focuses on the market structure, whether it
is dominated by the state or SOEs, whether there are systematic subsidies
granted in association with the market, etc. Combining these factors
together can be indicative of whether they lead inevitably to distortion of
prices by making presumptive inference from status, without demonstrating
the consequences in fact. This proposal’s rationale is based in part on the
underlying evidentiary problems given that information about all the factors
listed above may not be available in China. Hence, all factors are relevant
and the rebuttable presumption can be made based on several of these
factors.
Specificity
One additional problem in disciplining SOEs receiving financial
advantages lies in the difficulty in establishing the legal requirement that an
actionable subsidy must be specific.78 Despite China’s commitments in its
accession to the WTO that subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as
specific if SOEs are the predominant recipients of such subsidies or SOEs
receive disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies,79 it is hard to
find evidence regarding the outcome of a subsidy in terms of recipients.
The author proposes, instead of focusing on the outcome of a subsidy,
to focus on the market power of recipients (SOEs) in question, i.e., whether
they are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or enjoy exclusive rights
to the exclusion of POEs, in finding the legal element of “specificity”. This
proposal comes with a rebuttable presumption rule that financial advantages
granted to those SOEs are deemed to be specific unless evidence to the
77

JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 84-87 (1990).
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 2, 1869, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14
79 World Trade Organization, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Part I,
¶.10.2, December 11, 2001.
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contrary can be proved. The proposal makes sense from economic and
historical viewpoints. In the view of economists, the requirement of
specificity cannot be explained by any economic rationale.80 Specificity
was not necessarily required by the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.81
Specificity is more of an administrative tool, and it embraces the “de facto”
test.82 It is due to an administrative contingency and judicial economy, as
well as the balance between the imposition of CVDs and grants of
subsidies, that specificity is required in the SCM Agreement. The
specificity test is a flexible test. For instance, it is more about legal
technicalities that specificity is deemed to exist for export subsidies. Such
flexibility and legal technicalities can be applied in cases involving giving
advantages to SOEs, who are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or
enjoy exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs.
Such a proposal can partially contribute to the solution of the problem
of granting financial advantages to industries which are dominated by
SOEs. To find evidence of market status is easier than finding out precisely
who receives subsidies and how much they receive.
B. Trade Rules Proposals
The author proposes to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to
all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and hence the
obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial considerations
in GATT Article XVII:1(b) can be applied to all SOEs with different kinds
of monopolies or exclusive rights. Furthermore, Article XVII:1(b) should
be revised to make it independent from Article XVII:1(a). To that end,
SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights would be
obligated not to give financial advantages to other SOEs. This proposal can
solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to other entities.
Requiring those SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive
rights to make decisions solely based on commercial considerations would
largely preclude them from giving financial advantages to other entities.
However, this proposal can’t solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial
advantages.
C. Competition Rules Proposal
The author proposes to prohibit SOEs from giving financial
advantages to others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior
affects or distorts competition. The proposal has competition rules
80
See Merit E. Janow & Robert W. Staiger, US–Export Restraints: United States–
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 201 (2003).
81 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT 181 (1979).
82 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed. 1997).
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elements, and hence, is called a competition rules proposal. More
specifically, the author would add to the WTO a provision such as Article
17.6 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which provides:
Each Party shall ensure that its state enterprises and state-owned
enterprises do not cause adverse effects to the interests of another
Party [nor distort or threaten competition] through the use of noncommercial assistance that the state enterprise or state-owned
enterprise provides to any of its state-owned enterprises with respect
to:
(a) the production and sale of a good by the state-owned enterprise;
(b) the supply of a service by the state-owned enterprise from the
territory of the Party into the territory of another Party; or
(c) the supply of a service in the territory of another Party through an
enterprise that is a covered investment in the territory of that other
Party or any other Party.83

The bracketed language is not in the TPP provision, but it would be useful
to add such bracketed language as wording “nor distort or threaten
competition.” The bracketed language was inspired by the EU rules in that
they regulate state aid within the competition rules framework to the extent
that state aid threatens the goal of “a single market” pursued by European
countries in the process of integration.84 It regulates state aid that distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods.85 The phrase “distort or threaten competition”
in the bracket is not exactly the same as “cause adverse effects to another
state’s interests”. The phrase “distort or threaten competition” adds
something new. There might be a situation where the welfare of the
subsidizing country decreases while the other countries’ welfare may not
decrease. This situation, while not covered by the phrase “cause adverse
effects to another state’s interests,” can be captured by the phrase “distort or
threaten competition”. This proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving
financial advantages to others since it captures all SOEs in areas of trade of
goods or services domestic and overseas. However, this proposal can’t
solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial advantages.
D. Combination of Proposals
From examining the proposals above, problems identified can be
83

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 17.6(2), Feb. 4, 2016.
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largely solved through three ways. One is through the trade remedies
proposals alone, i.e., proposals regarding a public body to solve the
problem of SOEs giving financial advantages, and proposals regarding
privatization, benchmark, and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs
giving financial advantages. The second way is through the combination of
the trade remedies proposals, i.e., proposals regarding privatization,
benchmark and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial
advantages, and the trade rules proposals to solve the problem of SOE
giving financial advantages. The third way is through the combination of
the trade remedies proposals, i.e., proposals regarding privatization,
benchmark and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial
advantages, and the competition rules proposal to solve the problem of
giving financial advantages.
E. This Article’s Contribution Compared to Other Approaches
This Article’s contribution to current academic literature and legal
practice is explained as follows. This article exams the financial advantages
in the context of SOEs from two dimensions, i.e., one is that SOEs give
financial advantages, and the other is that SOEs receive financial
advantages. The proposal suggested in this article is also made within this
framework as identified in the above section.
1. PTAs
In respect of the comparison with SOE rules and development in
preferential trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in
particular, proposals made here, although have some similarities with the
TPP, differ from what was proposed in the TPP to some extent. In the TPP
negotiations, there were proposals from its members about disciplines on
SOEs receiving various advantages.86 Ultimately, the TPP was concluded
with a chapter on SOEs.87 This chapter has provisions regarding noncommercial assistance to SOEs or given by SOEs; obligations imposed on
SOEs’ behavior, such as non-discriminatory treatment and the requirement
to act in light of commercial considerations; transparency of SOEs;
designated monopolies, particularly state monopolies; and various
exceptions and long transitional periods. These rules were drafted with an
eye on Chinese SOEs although China was not a party to the TPP
86 The U.S.’s proposals and position can be found in State-Owned Enterprises and
Competition Policy, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tppchapter-chapter-negotiating-7; For a general discussion about SOEs in the context of TPP
Agreement Negotiations, see Tsuyoshi Kawase, Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and
Rulemaking to Regulate Stat-Owned Enterprises, VOXEU.ORG (Jul. 19, 2014), http://voxeu.
org/article/trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-and-rulemaking-regulate-state-ownedenterprises.
87 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 17, Feb. 4, 2016.
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negotiations.88 The United States also wants to incorporate detailed SOEs
rules in future FTAs as well. For instance, the United States announced its
intent to renegotiate the NAFTA, and listed objectives for this
renegotiation.89 Among many things, one objective in the list concerns
state-owned and controlled enterprises, including the definition of SOEs,
ensuring the behavior of SOEs accords with non-discriminatory treatment
and with the requirement to make decisions based on commercial
considerations, ensuring additional subsidy disciplines on SOEs,
transparency requirements, overcoming evidentiary problems associated
with litigation on SOEs, etc.90
“Vietnam has become the EU’s second biggest trading partner in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations after Singapore and ahead of
Malaysia.”91 EU and Vietnam announced that they have agreed on the final
text for the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on June 2018, which
is to be signed in 2018.92 There is a Chapter called “State Owned
Enterprises, Enterprises Granted Speical Rights, or Privileges and
Monopolies” in the draft of the EU-Vietnam FTA. It basically requires
SOEs to behave according to non-discrimination principle and based on
commercial considerations. The subsidies rules are embedded in the
Chapter of “Competition Policy”, which provides the exception of “public
policy objective” for providing subsidies. However, it doesn’t have
provisions specifically regarding SOEs giving or receiving non-commercial
advantages. The wording of the subsidies rules and SOE rules in the EUVietnam FTA is similar to that in the TPP except for the fact that the EUVietnam FTA has more exceptions.93
Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and
Malaysia were launched in 2010 and pub on hold after seven rounds in
2012 at the request of Malaysia. A stocktaking exercise took place in 201617 to assess the prospect to presume negotiations. In the aftermath of the
88 Keith Bradsher, International Business: Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Potential Impact
Weighed in Asia and U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/
business/international/trans-pacific-partnerships-potential-impact-weighed-in-asia-and-us.
html?_r=0 ; Tuong Lai, What Vietnam Must Now Do, N.Y. TIMES (The Opinion Pages),
translated by Nguyen Trung Truc from the Vietnamese, Apr. 6, 2015. http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/04/07/opinion/what-vietnam-must-now-do.html.
89 See USTR: Trump Administration Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North
American Free Trade Agreement, USTR.Gov., https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces.
90 See Summary of Objective for the NAFTA Renegotiation, Jul. 17, 2017, USTR.GOV,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf;
Although
Article 1503 of NAFTA touches on SOEs, it leaves much to the hand of the WTO rules. The
TPP Agreement may divert some attention from the WTO to elsewhere.
91 European Commission, EU and Vietnam Finalize Trade and Investment Discussion,
26 June 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1875
92 Id.
93 EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, Annex 10-a.
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general elections in Malaysia in May this year [2018], the new government
has yet to take a position on the possible resumption of negotiations.94
It is expected that a FTA, if it is to be concluded, between EU and
Malaysia, will be similar to the EU-Vietnam FTA. In addition, the
negotiation of EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been
finalized in December 2017. Chapter 12 of EU-Japan EPA has subsidies
rules, which refer to the SCM Agreement for the definition of “subsidies”.
It also has exceptions for public policy objective. Nevertheless, exceptions
here are much fewer than that in the EU-Vietnam FTA. Provisions relating
to SOEs are provided in Chapter 14 of the EU-Japan EPA.
The competition rules proposal suggested here were inspired by what
was drafted in the TPP as well as other PTAs mentioned above to the extent
that the author’s proposals suggest WTO incorporating a provision such as
Article 17.6 of the TPP, and hence prohibit SOEs from giving financial
advantages. Nevertheless, the author suggested one more phrase of “distort
or threaten competition” to be added given that it captures more situations
and cases than the phrase of “cause adverse effects to another state’s
interests” as explained in the above section. Second, the TPP proposed
directly prohibiting SOEs from receiving non-commercial assistance from
SOEs, state enterprises and states in its Article 17.6. In contrast, the
author’s proposal to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial
advantages is through trade remedy rules, i.e., slight alteration of current
trade remedy rules regarding benchmark and specificity in the context of
SOEs. Third, to solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages, the
author also proposes modification of current definition of “public body” to
accomodate entities that are under the meaningful control of the
government, and with monopolistic or dominant market power, as well as
the trade rules proposals that SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or
exclusive rights would be obligated not to give financial advantages to
other SOEs due to the obligation of making decisions solely based on
commercial considerations. The distinctive features of the author’s
proposals also lie in the fact that the author focus on SOEs with monopolies
and exclusive rights, or SOEs with dominant market power, which are more
of concern, rather than every tiny SOE.
The authors’ proposals are better in a political sense that states with
large presence of SOEs are reluctant to accept rules that directly prohibit
SOEs from receiving financial advantages. Alternatively, slight alteration of
current trade remedies rules could be potentially acceptable to these states.
In addition, rules that capture every SOEs is not politically favored by
states that have lots of SOEs. On the other hand, it is only those SOEs that
have monopolies or exclusive rights, or dominant market power that would
cause concern in need of being addressed. A small and tiny SOE is not a big
94 European Commission, Countries and Regions: Malaysia, Aug. 1, 2018, http://ec.
europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/malaysia/
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concern since it won’t negatively affect market which is competitive.
2. Other Proposals
In respect of engaging in discussion with other academic articles on
SOEs, explanations will be given in terms of the difference from current
literation, whether they support the author’s position or differ from it, and if
so, why the author’s approach is better.
Regarding SOEs as recipients of financial advantages, the literature on
SOEs recognized that the receipt of advantages by SOEs is a problem, but
most legal analyses were about enterprises receiving advantages from
governments in general, without a further distinction between receipts of
advantages by SOEs and receipts of advantages by POEs.95 They pointed
out the severe nature of the problem and briefly outlined the relevant rules
covering international trade, investment and competition.96 But
recommendations were merely general. For instance, the newest and latest
literature,97 relying on the TPP Agreement and FTAs signed by the U.S.,
put forth proposals of disciplining SOEs in general from a norm
development perspective. Taking another example, other articles suggested
special rules specifically tailored to SOEs with respect to five elements for
the purpose of regulation. The five elements are i) a clear definition and
scope of SOEs; ii) clear general obligations and rights; iii) specific
disciplines on trade-distortive practices by SOEs and specific exceptions;
iv) provisions to improve transparency; and v) rules regarding
enforceability and dispute settlement.98 In contrast, the author’s analysis
focuses on SOEs in particular in the context of financial advantages. The
author makes proposals from two dimensions, one is to tackle the problem
of SOEs giving financial advantages, and the other is to address the
problem of SOE receiving advantages. For that purpose, this article
analyses legal problems from the two perspectives above, by looking at the
issue of SOEs as givers as well as upstream subsidies in the context of
SOEs, and the issue of SOEs as receivers that poses extra challenges to the
legal analyses of “benchmark” “specificity” and “privatization”. The goals
that are pursued by other articles and scholars are similar to the author,
which is to discipline SOEs, particularly the uncompetitive advantage.
95

Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis. A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue
Industrial Policy And Renewable Energy: The Case For Redrafting The Subsidies
Agreement Of The WTO. 17 J. OF INTL. ECON. L. 11, 47 (2014).
96 Michael M. Du, China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law 63 (2), International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 409, 448 (Jan. 11, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2377797.
97 Julien Sylvestre Fleury & Jean-Michel Marcoux, The US Shaping of State-Owned
Enterprise Disciplines in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 19 J. OF INTL. ECON. L., 445, 465
(2016); Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic
Law: Are We Moving in the Right Direction?, 19(3) J. OF INTL. ECON. L. 657, 680 (2016).
98 Willemyns, supra note 97.

305

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:275 (2019)

Nevertheless, the author’s proposals can achieve goals in a feasible way
from a political perspective. It is in part due to the fact that the author’s
proposals are more indirect, rather than directly targeting SOEs in general.
Countries with SOEs are more acceptable to those indirect proposals, such
as proposals are framed in the specific context of subsidies.
In addition, the author’s proposals draw much attention to the elements
of “monopolistic or dominant market power”. For instance, regarding
“benchmark” in the context of subsidies, the author suggests a refutable
presumption that the fact that the SOEs are the predominant suppliers
establishes that there is price distortion, and hence it justifies an alternative
benchmark. With respect to the element of “specificity” in the context of
subsidies, the author suggests a rebuttable presumption rule that financial
advantages granted to SOEs that are monopolistic or dominant in the
industry or enjoy exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs, are deemed to
be specific unless evidence to the contrary can be proved. The possibility of
realizing such proposals are also analyzed in the section above.
Regarding SOEs as givers of financial advantages, recent literature
analyses whether SOEs are public bodies or not, the implications of
different standards of “public bodies” for Chinese SOEs,99 criticizes the
method of interpretation by the AB at the WTO regarding the term “public
body” and its flaws, and suggests preference for majority ownership criteria
in finding a public body in the context of subsidies.100 In contrast, after
pushing the current WTO rules to their limit, and analyzing whether
different approaches might be utilized within the WTO rules to solve the
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, the author suggests a novel
definition of the phrase “public body” by focusing on combining elements
of “under meaningful control of the government” and “monopolistic power,
exclusive rights or dominant market power”. The proposal has its potential
to be realized in practice given that it is sort of in a middle position between
the “government control” standard and the “government vested authority”
standard that have been discussed in WTO jurisprudence so far. Second, the
factor of “meaningful control” and the factor relating to “market status”,
such as “monopolies, exclusive rights or dominant market power” do not go
too far away from the latest jurisprudence of panels and AB, and hence,
much controversy won’t be expected to arise.

99 Ru Ding, Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 (1) J. OF WORLD
TRADE, 167 (2014); Dukgeun Ahn, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 105 (4) AM. J. OF INTL. L. (2011);
Tegan Brink, What Is a ‘Public Body’ for the Purpose of Determining a Subsidy after the
Appellate Body Ruling in US – AD/CVD?, 6 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J., 313, 315,
(2011).
100 Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznowskl, Is Something Going Wrong in
the WTO Dispute Settlement, 46 (5) J. OF WORLD TRADE, 979, 1016 (2012).
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IV. CONCLUSION
SOEs receive more financial advantages and often act as givers of
financial advantages, posing challenges to current WTO rules. After
pushing current rules to its limits by different approaches, these challenging
issues are not resolved yet.
The author recommends trade remedy proposals to treat as public
bodies those SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and
are given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions in a
particular industry within the meaning of the SCM Agreement;
recommends to treat the benefits obtained prior to privatization as not
extinguished even if the privatization is at arm’s length and for fair-market
value; recommends that it is refutably presumed there is price distortion if a
government/SOEs is/are the predominant supplier(s); recommends with a
rebuttable presumption rule that financial advantages granted to those SOEs
are deemed to be specific unless evidence to the contrary can be proved;
recommends trade rules proposals to expand the coverage of GATT Article
XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and
hence the obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial
considerations in GATT Article XVII:1(b) can be applied to all SOEs with
different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights; recommends competition
elements proposals to prohibit SOEs from giving financial advantages to
others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior affect or distorts
competition, by adding competition elements to current WTO rules. A
combination of trade remedies proposals, trade rules proposals, and the
competition rules proposal can solve the problems identified in this article.
By comparison with current SOE rules and development in preferential
trade agreement, such as TPP draft, the ongoing NAFTA negotiations as
well as the United States’ free trade agreements, and after encountering
with current other academic articles, the author concludes that the legal
analyses and proposals made in this article are distinctive and novel with
large potential to be realized in terms of political willingness and legal
techniques.
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